

## **The Colonial Legacy of Policing as Statebuilding**

**Kaden Paulson-Smith**

**Chapter in forthcoming edited volume, *The Intellectual Legacies of M. Crawford Young***

**(eds. Scott Straus and Aili Mari Tripp)**

### **Abstract**

This chapter reframes policing as a colonial legacy of statebuilding by using Crawford Young's six imperatives of the colonial state to evaluate British archival records. It argues that the colonial police should be seen as central to manifesting the state's defining imperatives. Policing tactics sought to repress indigenous resistance, allow for the ruthless extraction of labor and resources, and establish a state apparatus. Africans working in areas of concentrated political and economic power, like the colonial capital of Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, challenged colonial statebuilding vis-à-vis police. What is cast as the "corruption" of police forces across the African continent can be more accurately understood as the design of the modern police and a postcolonial leftover from confrontations with the police.

### **Introduction**

Between 2019 and 2021, individuals in thirty-four African countries viewed the police as the most corrupt of state institutions and "more predatory than protective," with many reporting violent encounters, especially among the most vulnerable (Logan 2022). Police corruption, extortion, violence, and political manipulation across the African continent has been broadcast by media outlets, investigated by humanitarian organizations, scrutinized by international leaders, and increasingly studied by scholars (Beek et al. 2017; Sakpa 2020; *SABC News* 2021; *Al Jazeera* 2022). While much of this has come to the fore since global uprisings against police violence in summer 2020 (Cave, Albeck-Ripka, and Magra 2020) and increased vulnerability to state violence throughout the COVID-19 Pandemic (Hayden 2021), others have documented a longer trajectory of these views and systematic experiences (see Agbiboa 2015).

Even when contextualizing violent experiences with the police within longer histories of state violence, issues with policing today are commonly framed as deviations from otherwise protective institutions. For instance, when tracing the roots of one of the most infamous cases of a corrupt and violent police force (Egwu 2021) to the apartheid regime, journalists claim that the South African Police Service's violence has caused "an inherent disconnect between the mandate of law enforcement and the perception of the execution of their duties" (Feltham and Rupiah 2021). Police violence, in this case, is considered contrary to the role of the police, leading people to fear and oppose the police instead of going to them for protection, which is implied as the police's purpose. Furthermore, the police's function as a coercive arm of government is implied to be a new development, despite prior colonial histories that established the police as such (in the case of South Africa, see Steinberg 2014).

Around the world, this kind of framing has led to recommendations advocating for legal reforms, eliminating impunity and implementing punitive measures, separating the police from the executive branch, demilitarizing police forces, offering legal trainings for police officers and citizens, emphasizing compliance with human rights principles, improving reporting mechanisms, and providing greater funds to professionalize forces and prevent bribery and extortion (Transparency International 2016; "Panel of Experts Report On Policing and Crowd Management" 2018; Dalton 2020; Burger 2021; Valencia Talane 2021; Louise 2022). However, the logic of reform rests on certain assumptions about the purpose of the modern police and its relationship to the state and society. These assumptions are rooted in the fabled origin story of the modern police and its founding principles. An historical examination of the development of the police and state within a broader history of colonization problematizes reform as a solution.

The most often repeated narrative is that Britain's 1829 Metropolitan Police Act initiated the world's first professionalized police force (Novak et al. 2019). As the story goes, this model was subsequently adopted by cities throughout the northern United States and other world powers. New principles were supposed to distinguish modern police forces and policing tactics from what came before (e.g., informal community night watches). Modern police forces were supposed to be seen as civilian not military, they were to be separate from the state not controlled by it, and they were to operate domestically not internationally—three principles that do the work of legitimizing police forces around the world to this day (Seigel 2018; 2019). Sir Robert Peel, known as the father of the modern police, characterized the new uniquely civilian nature of his “bobbies” with the motto, “the police are the public and the public are the people.” However, the first Metropolitan Police Force was actually the successor to the imperial force that Peel led for years prior in Ireland, the Royal Irish Constabulary (Sinclair 2008). Scholars like Micol Seigel (2018) and Stuart Schrader (2019) have since brought new evidence to light that contests these myths using the case of the former U.S. Office of Public Safety and its imperial deployment of police abroad.

One reason the civilian-military divide may persist and continue to effectively reinforce the legitimacy of today's police around the world (Seigel 2019, 523) is because the foundational role of enslavement and imperialism in this institution's development is often neglected. Scholars have traced the relationship between contemporary police forces and historic slave patrols in the Carolina and Virginia colonies in the 1700s, noting that the legislation that deputized slave catchers as agents of the state came from the Barbados colony in the 1600s (Hadden 2003). There is a need for more empirical and theoretical research in other contexts to understand the development of the police within systems of enslavement and colonialism. The

history of the colonial police and its present implications are “(elements) of a global history of policing that still waits to be written” (Beek et al. 2017, 21–22). Colonization provides a crucial and often erased link in the puzzle for how the police got to be this way, what they were initially designed to do, and where to go from here.

In this analysis, I will focus on the centrality of policing under British colonialism to contribute to theories of the relationship between police, state, and society. Like the birth story of the modern police, this analysis also begins in the United Kingdom but earlier. Before bringing “the bobbies” to London, Sir Robert Peel led the Royal Irish Constabulary—not as a public “service” to the Irish, but as “an imposer of force on the people” (Sinclair 2008, 174). Ireland became a training center for police officers stationed throughout the British Empire. Between 1780 and 1850, Britain spread colonial police forces across its occupied territories, from Palestine, to India and Ceylon, to British-colonized West and East Africa (Sinclair 2008). Colonial police forces were tasked not with preventing or detecting crime, but with taking over the military’s responsibility of maintaining order and suppressing resistance, and they were accordingly trained to be “outwardly militaristic” (Sinclair 2008, 175).

Earlier still, in 1620, the first mention of “constables” appeared, followed by Bermuda Governor Woodhouse’s “prescribed law and order duties” in an oath dated 1624 (Sinclair 2007, 82–83; Burton 1955). It is not a coincidence that the first legal trace of policing was found in the first British colony to use labor from enslaved Africans in 1616.<sup>1</sup> One area for future research is the role of the police in relation to the legal abolition of slavery and the establishment of European colonies. An early influential treatise of colonial policing by Sir Charles Joseph Jeffries explained that there was a direct link between the two: “the abolition of slavery created the need for organised police forces ‘due to a well-justified fear on the part of the governing

class that the existence of this mass of unstable, excitable, ignorant and discontented people offered a serious threat to law and order' (Sinclair 2007, 83; Jeffries 1952, 60). Police were significant to European colonists in the transition from enslavement to colonization for maintaining a hold on tenuous and contested power. European powers saw themselves as "progressive" in replacing of slavery with colonialism, which they justified under the rubric of civilizing native populations, while in some places, abolition led to the slave trade becoming "more vigorous and highly ramified" (Cooper 2000, 113; see also the "Charter of Incorporation of the British South Africa Company" 1889). The police were also seen as significant to this alleged "civilizing" mission.

After the slave trade was legally abolished, taxation systems were imposed on native populations to pay for colonial administrations and their police forces so that they could carry out these law and order duties. A fundamental purpose of colonial police forces was to extract taxes and labor to finance the colonial administration and profit European metropolises (Killingray 1986, 411). Walter Rodney has translated colonial governments' emphasis on "the maintenance of law and order" to "the maintenance of conditions most favorable to the expansion of capitalism and the plunder of Africa" (2018, 196). In this sense, extortion and political control were not signs of a broken police force but a functioning one.

Furthermore, incidents of colonial police officers wielding and threatening violent force were not symptoms of policing gone awry; they were strategies that made the colonial state possible. What is cast as the "corruption" of police forces across the African continent and a defect of the postcolonial state can be more accurately understood as the design of the modern police and a persistent leftover from colonialism. These issues are not a defect of a key institution of the state, but an essential component that allowed for the repression of indigenous

resistance, ruthless extraction of labor and resources, theft and settlement of land, and establishment of a state apparatus. I develop this theory by examining the role of the police in carrying out colonization using Crawford Young's six imperatives of the colonial state and recently declassified British archival records.

### **Critical Theories of Police and Counter-Colonial Criminology**

Critical theories of police and policing are united by a focus on the historical development of the Anglo-American police since it is known as the first professionalized modern police force. This scholarship often homes in on how the modern police are implicated in systems of power, or the relationship between police and state and the dynamic of policing and resistance to it. Although theorists diverge in how much distance they claim to put between themselves and Foucauldian and Marxist frameworks, they all draw from them. Some call for the concept of "police" to be recovered and expanded (Neocleous 2021, 46), or for it to be more clearly defined and differentiated from more expansive Foucauldian notions of policing and governmentality (Seigel 2018, 6). Others might say that the very nature of police and policing is expansive, limitless, and undefinable by design. Markus Dirk Dubber's genealogy of the Anglo-American police leads him to unequivocally assert that of all government powers, "none is greater than the power to police, and none less circumscribed" (2005, xi). Conceptual disagreements aside, no one seems able to overstate the significance of studying police and policing in relation to systems of power.

One shortcoming of histories of police is that these studies often neglect the state. This is a missed opportunity because "the history of police is the history of state power" (Neocleous 2021, 46). The "fundamentally political" nature of policing is then "not an accusation of

corruption that calls for reform but an observation about form itself: policing is the quintessential translation of state power” (Seigel 2019, 522). Nowhere is the significance of the police to the state clearer than under European colonization. An analysis of colonial police and policing brings an important and necessary dimension to these theories.

Notably, “counter-colonial criminology” problematizes the study of crime “as a tool for imperialist domination” that continues to operate as a repressive technology alongside the police, prison, and army (Agozino 2003, 228). Biko Agozino places himself in a lineage of thinkers who he considers African colonial criminologists, including Franz Fanon, Walter Rodney, and Kwame Nkrumah, who saw how neo-colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism were able to extract capital without physical occupation (Agozino 2018, 3–5). Fanon describes how colonial regimes use such “agents of law and order” (here he includes soldiers alongside police officers) for “frequent, direct intervention” to “ensure the colonized are kept under close scrutiny” (2004, 4). Contrary to Peel’s portrayal of police officers as civilian servants instead of occupying soldiers, Fanon argues that the agent of law and order “does not alleviate oppression or mask domination,” but “displays and demonstrates them with the clear conscience of the law enforcer, and brings violence into the homes and minds of the colonized subject” (4). Later, Rodney also highlighted the role of “agents of repression,” who were mostly drawn from colonized populations and would aid in European conquest and domination across the African continent (2018, 172).

Insight into the role of violence is another major contribution from critical theories of police and policing. Around the world, the language used to describe incidents of police violence often mischaracterizes these incidents as aberrational to the institution of police. This has led scholars like Dylan Rodriguez to reject the term “police brutality” altogether, because it

suggests that violence is exceptional or outside the rules of policing, even though it is state sanctioned (Critical Resistance 2017). To more accurately capture the intended nature and purpose of the job of so-called “security workers,” “law enforcement,” and “police officers,” Seigel calls for taking up the term, “violence workers” (2018, 9–13). Historian Michelle Moyd similarly frames the labor of African soldiers in this nuanced way to show the complex nature of the violence behind colonization (2011). According to Seigel’s logic, the labor of policing involves violence not by mistake but by definition. The strongest evidence of this goes beyond the judicial and juridical basis of police power to a broader examination of the police’s mandate to manifest the state’s defining feature: “the monopoly of the legitimate use of force” (Weber 1958). The police and state therefore have an inseparable relationship where they strive to legitimate each other, and furthermore, where the “police realize—they *make real*—the core of the power of the state” (Seigel 2018, 10).

To manifest violent state power, the primary strategy of European colonial administrations is to divide societies to rule them (Mamdani 1996). The police are as essential to holding “the dividing line, the border” between colonized and colonizing forces (Fanon 2004, 3). This conceptualization is championed in U.S. society, which has instrumentalized the police and racialized constructions of criminality to shore up a dividing line for centuries (Muhammad 2010; Dafnos 2014). The police in these settings are tasked with upholding a “thin blue line” to prevent so-called uncivilized chaos from breaking out. In this sense, the police express the violence of the state as “a defense of civilization,” a justification rooted in ongoing colonial anxieties (Wall 2020).

Why does a critical framework of policing in relation to state and society matter? How citizens, scholars, journalists, and policymakers understand the police shapes their proposed



solutions. Misunderstanding the connection between racial authoritarianism and policing in the United States, for example, can lead to calls for procedural reform, which may be useful when “simply improving policing, not ridding democracy of authoritarian practices” (Weaver and Prowse 2020, 1176). Applying Rodriguez’s logic, if we view “police brutality” as an exception to how policing is normally done, reforms that focus on holding individuals accountable for violent incidents may be pursued in lieu of systematic transformations to an institution that is carrying out the mandate of legalized state-sanctioned violence. Exceptional instances of individual legal accountability do not necessarily change the legality of violent policing. An accurate and historically-informed conceptualization of the police’s purpose and function is necessary to respond to the challenges colonial legacies pose for the present.

### **Policing as Statebuilding**

If the fundamental and first purpose of the police is to manifest the state’s monopoly of violence, this should be observable from the beginning of the police and state. For many places around the world, these institutions were imposed as early acts of European colonization. In this analysis, I contribute to critical theories of police and policing and counter-colonial criminology to show how the police were central to colonial statebuilding. The police were not only used by European colonial powers to carry out the mandate of the state, but the police should be seen as ultimately responsible for creating the state itself. I begin by explaining how I conceptualize statebuilding, drawing from the aforementioned theories and Crawford Young’s canonical text, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (1997). I then show how the police attempted to execute the defining imperatives of the state under British colonial rule in the former Tanganyika Territory.

### *Statebuilding*

According to Young's framework, there are two stages of European domination: conquest and statecraft. Conquest was associated with the partition of territories (e.g., the "Scramble for Africa") and is often described as a single act, while creating states out of these territories was an extended series of acts that sought to establish "permanent domination" of European powers (Young 1997, 95). While these stages were in reality far less distinct or complete, this analysis focuses on the second stage, during which colonial police forces were spread throughout the world. The second stage, which Young refers to as "constructing *Bula Matari*,"<sup>2</sup> aimed to assert European sovereignty through diplomacy and/or force so as to convey superior power that would "congeal into enduring forms of dominance" (95). Long-lasting dominance was pursued through the establishment of states.

The imperial sovereignty doctrine of European international law allowed for the creation of states, not based on consent, but on whoever came out as victor in conquest and domination, as established by the Berlin Conference (1884–1885). Sovereignty would only hold if "effective occupation" was achieved, which required "prescriptive force by the creation of a visible infrastructure on the ground of garrisons [armed forces] that affirmed imperial presence and served as an embryonic framework for assertion of rule" (Young 1997, 96). In other words, European domination relied on the framework of states with borders to lay claim to territories and to establish rule, order, and revenue (100). Historians refer to the era after the Berlin Conference and into the early twentieth century as "New Imperialism," distinguished by the division of Africa among European powers and Britain's attempts to revive its imperial purpose and global financial supremacy (Cain and Hopkins 1987, 15; Gallagher 1982). A shift in

colonial bureaucratic strategy followed World War I. Colonial administrators became increasingly professionalized, instead of just being enlisted from military forces, and increasingly autonomous from central administrators and the metropole, due to limited communications technology (Young 1997, 101).

Colonial administrations required local security forces to establish hegemonic rule over more permanent colonies, but there were not enough European military troops to cover such wide swathes of land, which would also be too costly. The British rotated military officers between colonies and recruited within colonies, and “augmented” these troops with “sizable armed police forces” (Young 1997, 105). European powers that failed to establish coercive administrative apparatuses during this state-construction phase also risked rival colonial powers’ encroachment, as the Portuguese experienced in Angola.

Establishing hegemonic rule was fundamental to colonizing territories, but so was financing these governing structures, which led to more formalized agencies and extractive institutions to get indigenous populations to pay for the governing apparatuses being imposed on them (Young 1997, 78). While promises of great riches were made to metropolises, achieving this was quite difficult, so “the control of African labor, channeling it into basic infrastructure and taxable activity, became the very core of colonial state construction, the hinge on which its logic turned” (79). Establishing hegemony and generating revenue through controlling labor and taxing local populations were the principal imperatives that the state sought to achieve.

### *The Police in Young’s Imperatives of the State*

While not extensively discussed, Young left traces of how he thought the police and broader security forces featured in the project of statebuilding. Most evidently, on the cover of

*The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (1997) is a painting of the Congo Free State,<sup>3</sup> which Belgian King Leopold II brutally seized and operated as his personal possession, ultimately killing ten to fifteen million people. This painting depicts presumably African security officers being directed by a white Belgian authority overseeing their execution of violence. This image illustrates how Young conceptualized the colonial state. One might expect for professionalized security forces who wield coercive force to play a strong role in Young's theorizing of the colonial state. However, in his six imperatives of the state, police and policing only explicitly feature in two, hegemony and security: "hegemony is sustained through the policing apparatus whose professionalization is one of the hallmarks of the modern state" (Young 1997, 35–36; citing Bayley 1975), and hegemony required a local security force to "underwrite" it and serve as its "coercive arm" (Young 1997, 105).

I build on and depart from Young's understanding of the role of professionalized local security forces, from here on referred to as police. I theorize that the police were central to achieving, or attempting to achieve, all six state imperatives. The police did not just expand the state's reach and capacity of control, as Young observed (1997, 73–74); the police were the state's essential manifestation of power. The police were arguably more important than the military in carrying out day-to-day counterinsurgency campaigns to prevent challenges to the state, which often arose in situations when Africans refused to be subject to economic exploitation and colonial law and order (Paulson-Smith 2022). By this logic, police forces were not *part of* the state's "harsher realities of daily hegemony" (Young 1997, 166) because there was no preexisting state that they served. Rather, they *created* the state by enacting daily hegemony to effectively occupy indigenous peoples and their land, especially urbanizing areas

where economic and political power was concentrated. It is unclear how the creation of a colonial state could have been possible without the colonial police.

### *Alternatives Explanations*

Instead of viewing the police as necessary to the success of colonial domination and statebuilding, one alternative but not necessarily contrary view considers the colonial state and police as failures. According to this argument, the police may not have been a significant force during colonization, which is the position taken by Jeffrey Herbst. In *States and Power in Africa* (2000), Herbst's single discussion of the police (with the exception of a few quotations from other references) is in his overarching theory, that Europeans were limited in their attempts to consolidate power and assert authority over populations by the same factors as precolonial leaders (i.e., vast inhospitable territory and sparse populations).

To make this claim, Herbst invokes David Killingray's early history of colonial policing (1986, 114–15) to make the point that the colonial police were thinly spread throughout territories, which resembled early English policing in small towns before the professionalization of the force. Herbst points to the disproportionate police-to-civilian ratio and the limited reach of the British throughout their vast territories to make the claim that colonial policing, like statebuilding, was a failure (Herbst 2000, 79). Killingray's archival evidence from multiple contexts does paint a picture of the colonial police and the Native Authority<sup>4</sup> as small, inadequate, incompetent, weak, underfunded, ill-equipped, inefficient, illegitimate, and sometimes nonexistent (Killingray 1986).

This image leads Herbst to see the limitations of the colonial police as representing the failure of the colonial state: "Nothing so epitomizes the limited ambitions of many colonial

states, and the failure to establish empirical statehood, as the small size of the security forces that existed in the colonies through the terminal colonial period” (Herbst 2000, 79). For an institution that purportedly exemplifies Herbst’s argument, the police unfortunately do not merit further elaboration in his theoretical and empirical analysis of how the colonial state operated, or failed to operate. The theory of policing as statebuilding that I develop in this chapter by drawing from Young, would help explain Herbst’s and others’ assessment of the colonial state as a failure. Where the state was weak and nonexistent, so was the police. Furthermore, by examining specific instances where the police and state failed, we can gain insight into the local resistance behind these failures, following James Scott (1998; 2010). Studying the police as an entry-point to anti-colonial resistance may also reveal the “infrastructural frontiers” or “the material edge of states” marking the limits of colonial power (Schouten and Bachmann 2022, 2).

### **Analysis: Policing as Statebuilding?**

I start with Young’s imperatives of the colonial state, but where he deems the state central to achieving these imperatives essential to colonization, I argue that the police were. For this theory to be accurate, we would expect for the police to carry out the defining objectives of the state. If they do, particularly in contexts that do not use states in their political organization, it can be said that the police are bringing the state into being. It is most important that we observe the police carrying out the core twin imperatives of the state: creating hegemony and ensuring revenue generation. As Young implies, these imperatives come together most clearly in attempts to control labor.

I evaluate my theory of policing as statebuilding using archival data on colonial attempts to control African labor in Dar es Salaam, the former colonial capital of Tanganyika, which is

now known as mainland Tanzania. I use this case to evaluate whether the police can be said to be responsible for Young's six imperatives of the state: hegemony, autonomy, security, legitimacy, revenue, and accumulation. These imperatives cannot be measured separately because they are always interacting and usually competing (Young 1997, 40), so I also describe how they are connected, overlapping, and/or in tension with each other. I find evidence of the police attempting to achieve the main imperatives of the state, but at every turn, the people subjected to colonial rule (in this case, African workers in Dar es Salaam) mounted challenges to these imperatives. This leads me to conclude that the police were a main tool of colonization, but also an entry-point for resisting colonization. This dynamic would continue to shape the relationship between the police, state, and society after the end of formal colonial rule.

#### *A Dockworker Strike in Dar es Salaam*

Dockworkers in Dar es Salaam staged a major strike in 1950 that was violently suppressed by the police. The consequent series of demonstrations across town, police mobilization, and new surveillance policies and riot control practices that followed provide a window into how policing was deployed to carry out state imperatives and suppresses challenges to the establishment of a colonial state. Throughout the year 1950, there would be 50 strikes involving at least 7,444 workers and resulting in 11,006 working days lost, according to the *Tanganyika Annual Report of the Labour Department* (Jackson and Manktelow 2015, 220). The strike and the series of events that unfolded in its aftermath are constructed using previously classified British official correspondence, propaganda films, parliamentary Hansards, military manuals, annual reports, and news reports.

By examining the police on a local level in this center of British colonial power, more specificity comes to light that is necessary for understanding how policing and statebuilding worked on a daily basis (Paulson-Smith 2022). The police are examined through their actions and through the discourse circulating among British officials about their role in suppressing colonial uprisings, and resistance to the police and policing is examined through the actions and words of everyday workers, as much as possible.

In the three years preceding this strike, through collective bargaining and strikes, the Stevedores and Dockworkers Union won pay raises and policies that helped ensure compensation. One negotiation led to a scheme aimed to “control” and “regularize” labor (Fletcher-Cooke 1950). It proposed to systematize Port Authorities’ surveillance by adding a new gate to control workers’ entry into the harbor, to register all workers, and to turn daily-paid “casual” workers into monthly-paid permanent workers. The Union had previously waged and won a battle against a policy that would have forced everyone to become non-casual workers, who tended to receive less in wages than casual workers. The Union opposed this plan again and called for a strike the next day the policy was reintroduced. I will next describe the six imperatives of the state with an examination of the police’s role in carrying out that imperative in the context of the dockworker strike.

### *I. Hegemony*

Establishing hegemony involves establishing domination through discipline and punishment according to a created rule of law (Young 1997, 36; borrowing from Foucault 1995). If the police were carrying out the hegemonic objective of the state, they would be involved in a continuous “struggle to ensure the supremacy of their authority” and counter refusals to that



authority with force (Young 1997, 35). As stated earlier, hegemony is one of the two imperatives that Young explicitly identifies with policing.

When the Dockworkers Union threatened to strike, this was perceived as a challenge to colonial supremacy and authority, so the police preemptively intervened and tried to eliminate the threat. They used force by opening fire on a crowd of civilians who were armed with sticks, stones, and farm tools because this strike was seen to present so much of a threat to colonial domination that it was not enough to simply arrest and imprison the workers later. This strike was not only a refusal to work, but “a refusal to acknowledge the domination of the state,” which called for force (Young 1997, 35). In his report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Deputy Governor condemned the strike as “irresponsible” and proclaimed that the Union’s actions “constituted a challenge to law and order” (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 2). This collective refusal was perceived as such a challenge because it was a rejection of the legitimacy of the imposed law and order and a threat to the economic extraction that law and order was supposed to maintain (Rodney 2018, 196).

The police were the main agents responsible for the “continuous struggle to ensure the supremacy of their [colonial] authority” (Young 1997, 35). Because this strike challenged colonial hegemony, London concluded that the only way to reinforce their rule was through increasing the police’s capacity for violence to subdue future “disturbances” like the strike and following demonstrations. The legitimacy of the police’s use of force was never questioned by officials in London, as evidenced by their insistence that a “formal enquiry” into the “disturbance” was unnecessary (“Tanganyika: Strikes and Riots” 1950).

## *II. Autonomy*

Autonomy, in the context of a colonized territory, is the degree of independence and sovereignty in relation to the metropole. Colonial authorities were increasingly only constrained by settler communities and corporate interests (Young 1997, 159). If the police were responsible for increasing the autonomy of the colonial administration, they would aim to consolidate power and professionalize and institutionalize the “apparatus of rule” (36). The police would allow for high-level colonial officials to be increasingly independent in interpreting their own territory’s interests and managing the territory accordingly (122).

The police advanced the autonomy of the Tanganyika colonial administration by becoming an increasingly professionalized force, especially after WWII, and increasingly independent from command at the London Colonial Office. Colonial police forces had their own hierarchical administrations in each territory, and they were mostly only constrained by their equipment. This arrangement allowed them to act fairly autonomously without too much oversight from the Tanganyika Governor.

The strike demonstrates that the police were interpreting what the colonial administration’s interests were in this situation and acting relatively independently to neutralize threats to those interests. Reports filed by the Deputy Governor and messages between London officials suggest that they wanted to preserve this independence of the police. They blocked an official inquiry into the demonstrations, and they were primarily concerned with better equipping the police to prevent future so-called disturbances. The workers were challenging this autonomy by challenging the police, those who were entrusted with carrying out British colonial policies. The Deputy Governor sought to impress upon his higher-ups in London that the threat these workers posed was eliminated. The strikers were cast as a “small irresponsible element” of

“hooligans” who were believed to “have left town,” and “at no time was the situation out of hand” (Fletcher-Cooke 1950; “Tanganyika: Strikes and Riots” 1950).

### *III. Security*

While conventional contract theory holds that a state agrees to provide safety for its citizens in exchange for their sacrifice of some freedoms, this does not apply to colonial states because they did not necessarily rely on the consent of colonized populations to govern. Instead, “no social contract other than conquest bound its subjects to its rule” (Young 1997, 139). As previously mentioned, Young illustrates this relationship using the symbol of Bula Matari. So while ensuring public safety is theoretically at the heart of a state’s reason for being, in colonial contexts, security is instead associated with “the hegemonic apparatus” of coercion (Young 1997, 117). In this sense, securing the colonial enterprise is perhaps the most obvious state imperative for which the police are responsible, and Young does acknowledge the police, and military, as “the institutional core of the state” (37).

The strikers and the protestors they inspired constituted a direct threat to the internal security of the territory in the eyes of the police. They viewed the demonstrators as violent before they acted and found their concealed weapons as further evidence of this threat they posed to security (Fletcher-Cooke 1950). According to the Deputy Governor, “it was found that in every case the arrested persons were carrying concealed weapons such as knives, axes, iron bars, bottles and clubs” (emphasis in original). The strike and actions of the protestors were also characterized by one journalist as the “attempted murder” of a British police officer (Reuter 1950).<sup>5</sup> These protestors were perhaps depicted as such a threat because they challenged the security of those tasked with providing the security of the state.

The state imperative of achieving security for the colonial enterprise was threatened by workers organizing to protect their own security through protesting new policies that would reduce their wages, job security, and safety through increased surveillance and more frequent interactions with the police. The colony's financial security relied on workers showing up and operating the docks, and the colonizers' physical security relied on workers falling in line and not acting collectively since they outnumbered the British. Even though military troops were called in to stand by and navy ships circled the harbor, it was the police who intervened and who were in charge of suppressing the subsequent demonstrations throughout town ("Tanganyika: Strikes and Riots" 1950). More so than the military and navy, the police seemed to be what Young terms the main "national security council" of the state (Young 1997, 37) due to their daily policing duties in commercial centers like Dar es Salaam.

As the institutional core of the state, the aftermath of the strike led the police to further arm and equip themselves to suppress future "disturbances" to the state's security. The police's struggle to put down the strike and following demonstrations were attributed to police forces not being sufficiently well equipped with tear gas and communications technology: "It seems to me that if a little of this had been used on the mob at the right moment it would have had the desired effect but I doubt whether any tear gas bombs were available!" and "The disturbance in question clearly shows the weakness of Police equipment," in the words of the Assistant Police Adviser in London, who had previously worked in the London Metropolitan Police (Abbiss 1950).

#### *IV. Legitimacy*

Legitimacy is the core of the Weberian state because hegemonic rule rests on its own credibility. If the police were responsible for producing legitimacy for British colonization, they

would visibly possess superior force to demonstrate their monopoly on violence and thus credibility (Young 1997, 37). According to Fanon, every police officer and soldier served as “the official, legitimate agent, the spokesperson for the colonizer and the regime of oppression” (2004, 3). However, coercion is like a gold reserve that underpins this power: if coercion is used too much, it loses value (Young 1997, 37; citing Parsons 1964). Therefore, we would expect the police to attempt to render colonial rule legitimate not solely through using violence, but through maintaining the threat and possibility of using violence at any time (Seigel 2018).

There are two angles from which to evaluate the state imperative of legitimacy: from the inside of a colony (e.g., as perceived by populations subject to colonial rule or European colonial settlers) and from the outside of a colony (e.g., as perceived by European metropolises or the United Nations). The police feature prominently in attempts to create a sense of a legitimate state from both angles.

Young believes that the colonial administration’s “battle for legitimation on the European front was won, but colonial agents were well aware that its command over its subjects relied ultimately on force” (Young 1997, 139). This made establishing hegemony precarious, so the police sought to create the appearance of legitimacy to suppress challenges to colonial rule, which was potentially one reason they were used instead of the military to ensure daily hegemony from within the territory. During the strike, the police sought to preserve colonial authority and maintain the right to enforce these policies by demonstrating that they possessed “superior force” to the workers (Young 1997, 37). As previously mentioned, this duty lies at the heart of the Weberian state, which has a monopoly over violence. The police sought to visibly demonstrate their capacity for violence as a way to uphold their claim to legitimate use of this violence and therefore legitimate domination over the territory.

The strike challenged the state's legitimacy that the police attempted to create. The Dockworkers Union sent "threatening" letters with their demands to the Port Manager, Labour Commissioner, Chief Secretariat, and Private Secretary (The Stevedores and Dockworkers Union 1950). When those demands were not met, the dockworkers withheld their labor. This signifies not only a questioning of increased monitoring, regulation, and control, but a questioning of the authority behind these policies. Through withholding their labor, the workers were challenging the harbor and colonial administration's power to make them work.

#### *V. Revenue and VI. Accumulation*

Revenue generation was central to colonization because resources were at a minimum required to finance the administration of colonies, and resources were expected to stimulate the western European economy, especially in the period of post-war reconstruction. If the police were central to ensuring revenue generation, they would "engage in a ceaseless struggle with civil society to extract the resources necessary" (Young 1997, 38). The police would do this while attempting to balance acting as a predator with maintaining legitimacy, which is the challenge that Young identifies with achieving this imperative (1997, 39) and a tension that is contested today (Logan 2022).

Accumulation is the amassing of wealth through an expanding economic base that generates revenue. African labor was the primary factor of production during colonization as "virtually all operations" were labor intensive (Young 1997, 137). Across all colonial powers, public infrastructure was financed by "what amounted to a labor tax" (174). Especially after WWII, colonization required steady labor "under the direction of a property owner and the supervision of the state," and required that "laborers be made to learn and internalize new value

and attitudes” (Young 1997, 138; quoting Cooper 1997, 2–3). Young says labor was overseen by colonial administrators and African chiefs, but he does not name the police here. If the police were responsible for carrying out the imperative of accumulation, they would be at the forefront of attempts to establish an expanding economic base through controlling labor and ensuring revenue generation over time.

Financing and profiting off colonial territories were the main priorities and motivations of the British Empire, and the pressure to achieve these priorities only intensified throughout the twentieth century. The police were central to extracting resources for the colonial project most straightforwardly through tax collection, but also less noticeably through surveilling and controlling colonial workers, especially in urban areas where capital was concentrated. It follows that in labor disputes between African workers and colonial industries, the police took the side of commercial interests.

However, the Dockworkers Union tested the role of the police: they asked a police officer patrolling the docks on the morning of the strike if he would help prevent others from working. The officer refused, even though—as the dockworkers pointed out—police used the dock area to “get a hold of people,” preventing them from working on a regular basis (Fletcher-Cooke 1950). The workers’ attempt to subvert the role of the police and their resulting observation highlights the conflicting nature of the police’s duties. The police attempted to achieve the state imperatives of revenue generation and accumulation, which involved not only threat but use of force, as was the case in suppressing the strike and its following demonstrations. Simultaneously however, the police attempted to secure legitimate hegemonic rule, which was undermined by use of force against subjected populations.

## **Conclusions and Implications: Postcolonial Legacies of Resisting Police and State**

A definitive insight that Young leaves us with is that “the colonial state lives, absorbed into the structures of the independent polity” due to the state’s “formidable capacity for its own reproduction across time and in the face of systematic efforts by new regimes to uproot prior forms and build new blueprints” (1997, 2). I argue that the police were essential to this production and reproduction of the state, so much so that the police should be central in Young’s conceptualization of Bula Matari, the symbol of “white domination that was the energizing force in the superstructure of imperial hegemony” (2). If we conceptualize the police as a distinctive feature of the nineteenth-century European state superimposed on African polities, this might help explain the persistent institutions of the colonial state, and the police’s place in it. Despite reforms and resistance to the police after independence, colonial policing institutions continued to shape state practices and ideologies of racialized, sexualized, gendered, and classed control in the territory that would become Tanzania in 1964 (Kamau 2006; Kapinga 2014; Shivji and Yahya-Othman 2014). Because of these connections, many contemporary issues are derived from the colonial legacies of the police and state.

Essential to addressing these issues is the takeaway that the colonial police system as the primary weapon of statebuilding never went unchallenged. Strikes, and more broadly collective organizing that challenged colonial imperatives, were deeply connected to resistance to the colonial police. These dynamics shaped postcolonial practices, ideas, and the materiality of policing and the state.

First, throughout formal colonial rule and during the transition to independence, anti-colonial efforts to dismantle the British Empire were bound up with resistance to the police. Challenging the police was central to liberatory self-governance strategies. Anti-colonial



resistance to the police helped bring about the end of the British Empire. This resistance involved attempts to physically interrupt and overthrow, bureaucratically weaken, and fundamentally delegitimize the police as a daily manifestation of the colonial state. These forms of resistance demonstrated that “the Territory could do without that force,” as stated by one African representative in the Legislative Council (Tanganyika Legislative Council 1959). I find that there was a rise in collective organizing to challenge colonial authority especially following World War II, as reflected by a wave of strikes, which resemble the one described here, across West and East Africa (Cooper 1996). These tactics often targeted or came head-to-head with the police. One potential explanation for this is that the police were the main way people came into contact with the state, so the police became an important avenue of resistance to colonialism. Collective organizing, like the dockworker strike, was not only resistance to economic exploitation but to forms of state surveillance, policing, and violence that were being ramped up during this pivotal time.

Second, the challenging of policing institutions in the transition to self-governance shaped the postcolonial police system and its relationship to the newly independent state, partly by disrupting its operations and partly by accelerating its growth and connections to London. We can see how efforts to disrupt colonial policing and to Africanize the inherited state accelerated the growth of policing leading up to independence through innovating strategies and stockpiling weapons for controlling riots, strikes, and forms of protest that continued through the end of formal British colonial rule. The broader security and intelligence system remained in place, and British officials sought to protect their power “by transforming formal empire into informal influence,” such as by fortifying this system with security assistance for decades to come (Maguire and Franklin 2020, 2). We can also see this through efforts to pass legal and

bureaucratic measures aimed at legitimizing and empowering the police, such as cross-national arrangements between governors aimed at expanding police power beyond state lines, and provisions to protect police power in Tanganyika's first constitution (Smith 1961). Overall, the falling British Empire was reluctant to concede control over the police and used the police to institutionalize their influence over the postcolonial state into independence.

This analysis raises questions such as, how do these legacies of coloniality, policing, and resistance inform state practices and ideas today? Why does this matter for contemporary politics in Tanzania and other postcolonial contexts? What role might social movements for police and prison abolition play in dismantling systems of state violence? If we understand that the mandate of the first police forces in many African contexts was to carry out the imperatives of the colonial state and bring the state into being, we may then see issues like violence and extortion not as flaws in executing that purpose, but as continuations of it. In this sense, the police is not broken but working exactly how it was designed to, which calls into question the logic of reforming the police, as expressed in recent uprisings such as the #EndSARS protests across Nigeria (Dayo 2020; Jones 2020). By putting this analysis in conversation with resistance in other postcolonial and settler colonial contexts, new insights may emerge about the continued and remaining work of decolonization.

---

<sup>1</sup> Here I use the verb *policing* to more broadly capture practices that seek to main “law and order,” which were delegated but not limited to constables. These practices go beyond the formal institution of police (Neocleous 2021), as the first mention of “Police as a body” found in the Bermuda Library was dated 1786 (Burton 1955). This sequencing provides insight into the growth and diffusion of British colonial police forces and discourse surrounding their professionalization. Note that from 1616 to 1684, Bermuda was operated by the Somers Isles Company until becoming a royal colony under the Crown.

<sup>2</sup> Bula Matari, literally “breaker of rocks,” was a nickname given to Henry Morton Stanley.

<sup>3</sup> I am very appreciative that Scott Straus pointed out this connection to me.

<sup>4</sup> I return to several of these cases in my analysis of British colonial archival data on Tanganyika, including Uganda, Kenya, Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. For more information on the Native Authority, which was established as part of the system of British indirect rule, see Burton, Andrew. 2002. “Adjutants, Agents, Intermediaries: The Native Administration in Dar Es Salaam Township, 1919–1961.” In *The Urban Experience in Eastern Africa, c. 1750-2000*, edited by Andrew Burton, 98–118. Nairobi, Kenya: British Institute in Eastern Africa.

---

<sup>5</sup> The newspaper article is entitled, "Attempted Murder" and reads, "Dar es Salaam March 23 Reuter – Eleven Africans charged with the attempted murder of a British police assistant superintendent and an Asian sub-inspector in a riot here on February 3 were today committed to Tanganyika high court for trial. They were committed from the resident magistrate's court here, where they were charged earlier this month. The two police officers, Assistant Superintendent J. M. McLoughlin and Sub-Inspector A. K. Bannerjee, were seriously wounded when striking African dockers attacked a police patrol. The police opened fire, killing one African and wounding seven. They arrested 86 Africans."

## Bibliography

- Abbiss, George. 1950. "Letter from Abbiss." CO 691/209/8. The National Archives, Kew.
- Agbiboa, Daniel Egiegba. 2015. "Protectors or Predators? The Embedded Problem of Police Corruption and Deviance in Nigeria." *Administration & Society* 47 (3): 244–81.
- Agozino, Biko. 2003. *Counter-Colonial Criminology: A Critique of Imperialist Reason*. London ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press.
- . 2018. "The Withering Away of the Law: An Indigenous Perspective on the Decolonisation of the Criminal Justice System and Criminology." *Journal of Global Indigeneity* 3 (1).
- Al Jazeera*. 2022. "US Issues Sanctions on Sudan's Police over Protest Crackdown," March 21, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/21/update-3-u-s-places-sanctions-on-sudans-central-reserve-police-over-protest-crackdown>.
- Bayley, David. 1975. "The Police and Political Development in Europe." In *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, edited by Charles Tilly, 328–79. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Beek, Jan, Mirco Göpfert, Olly Owen, and Jonny Steinberg. 2017. *Police in Africa: The Street Level View*. Oxford University Press.
- Burger, Johan. 2021. "South Africa's Police Need Urgent and Fundamental Reform." ISS Africa. June 28, 2021. <https://issafrica.org/crimehub/iss-today/south-africas-police-need-urgent-and-fundamental-reform>.
- Burton, Edward Angus. 1955. "Policing of Bermuda by E.A. 'Ted' Burton." *The Bermuda Historical Quarterly* Autumn Quarter. <https://www.expobermuda.com/index.php/lia/953-police-of-bermuda-e-a-burton>.
- Cain, P. J., and A. G. Hopkins. 1987. "Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945." *The Economic History Review* 40 (1): 1–26.
- Cave, Damien, Livia Albeck-Ripka, and Iliana Magra. 2020. "Huge Crowds Around the Globe March in Solidarity Against Police Brutality." *The New York Times*, June 6, 2020, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/world/george-floyd-global-protests.html>.
- "Charter of Incorporation of the British South Africa Company." 1889. MSS. Afr. s. 71. Oxford, Bodleian Libraries.
- Cooper, Frederick. 1996. "'Our Strike': Equality, Anticolonial Politics and the 1947-48 Railway Strike in French West Africa." *The Journal of African History* 37 (1): 81–118.
- . 1997. *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor & Agriculture in Zanzibar & Coastal Kenya, 1890-1925*. Portsmouth, N.H: Heinemann.
- . 2000. "Conditions Analogous to Slavery." *Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Postemancipation Societies* 1: 107–50.
- Critical Resistance. 2017. *Dylan Rodriguez, "It's Not Police Brutality."* Breaking Down the Prison Industrial Complex. <https://youtu.be/yIEUT2BvvtM>.
- Dafnos, Tia. 2014. "Social Movements and Critical Resistance: Policing Colonial Capitalist Order." In *Criminalization, Representation, Regulation: Thinking Differently about Crime*, edited by Deborah Brock, Amanda Glasbeek, and Carmela Murdocca, 1st edition, 385–418. North York, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, Higher Education Division.
- Dalton, Melissa. 2020. "Conduct Is the Key: Improving Civilian Protection in Nigeria." The Center for Strategic and International Studies. July 9, 2020. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/conduct-key-improving-civilian-protection-nigeria>.

- Dayo, Bernard. 2020. "Can Nigeria's #EndSARS Protests Lead to Police Abolition?" *Al Jazeera*, October 23, 2020. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/23/can-nigerias-endsars-protests-lead-to-abolishing-the-police>.
- Dubber, Markus Dirk. 2005. *The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Egwu, Patrick. 2021. "South African Police Are Undertrained, Uncontrolled, and Deadly." *Foreign Policy*, May. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/31/southafrica-police-brutality-julies/>.
- Fanon, Frantz. 2004. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Grove Press.
- Feltham, Luke, and Kiri Rupiah. 2021. "When Violence Is Policy: How Do We Curb Police Brutality?" *The Mail and Guardian*, April 25, 2021. <https://mg.co.za/politics/2021-04-25-when-violence-is-policy-how-do-we-curb-police-brutality/>.
- Fletcher-Cooke, John. 1950. "Confidential Telegram from Fletcher-Cooke to Jones, with Memorandum on 'Industrial Dispute: Dar Es Salaam Docks February, 1950.'" Dar es Salaam. CO 691/209/8. The National Archives, Kew.
- Foucault, Michel. 1995. *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. 2nd ed. New York: Vintage Books.
- Gallagher, John. 1982. *The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire: The Ford Lectures and Other Essays*. Edited by Anil Seal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511523847>.
- Hadden, Sally E. 2003. *Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas*. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.
- Hayden, Sally. 2021. "Africa's Hidden Victims: Pandemic Prompted Surge in Police Brutality." *100Reporters* (blog). June 28, 2021. <https://100r.org/2021/06/africas-hidden-victims-pandemic-prompts-surge-in-police-brutality-blacklivesmatter/>.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. 1 edition. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Jackson, Will, and Emily Manktelow. 2015. *Subverting Empire: Deviance and Disorder in the British Colonial World*. Springer.
- Jeffries, Sir Charles Joseph. 1952. *The Colonial Police*. M. Parrish.
- Jones, Mayeni. 2020. "End Swat: Nigerians Reject Police Unit Replacing Hated Sars." *BBC News*, October 14, 2020, sec. Africa. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54531449>.
- Kamau, Evelyn. 2006. "The Police, The People, The Politics: Police Accountability in Tanzania." Nairobi, Kenya: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and Kenya Human Rights Commission. [https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/tanzania\\_country\\_report\\_2006.pdf](https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/tanzania_country_report_2006.pdf).
- Kapinga, Wilbert B.L. 2014. "Organs of State Violence: The Police Force." In *Escalating State Violence and Impunity: A Reader*, edited by Issa G. Shivji and Saida Yahya-Othman, 13–23. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Media Council of Tanzania.
- Killingray, David. 1986. "The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa." *African Affairs* 85 (340): 411–37.
- Logan, Carolyn. 2022. "Africans across 34 Countries See the Police as Predatory, Not Protective." *Washington Post*, March 19, 2022. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/19/afrobarometer-police-in-africa/>.

- Louise, Edwards. 2022. "Model Law Promotes Rights-Based Police Reform across Africa." Association for the Prevention of Torture. January 3, 2022. <https://www.apt.ch/en/blog/model-law-promotes-rights-based-police-reform-across-africa>.
- Maguire, Thomas J., and Hannah Franklin. 2020. "Creating a Commonwealth Security Culture? State-Building and the International Politics of Security Assistance in Tanzania." *The International History Review*, April, 1–22.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. 1st edition. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Moyd, Michelle. 2011. "Making the Household, Making the State: Colonial Military Communities and Labor in German East Africa." *International Labor and Working-Class History*, no. 80: 53–76.
- Muhammad, Khalil Gibran. 2010. *The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America*. Harvard University Press.
- Neocleous, Mark. 2021. *A Critical Theory of Police Power: The Fabrication of the Social Order*. Verso.
- Novak, Kenneth, Gary Cordner, Bradley Smith, and Roy Roberg. 2019. *Police & Society*. 8th edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
- "Panel of Experts Report On Policing and Crowd Management." 2018. South African Police Service. <https://www.scribd.com/document/504368279/Panel-of-experts-report-on-policing-and-crowd-management>.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1964. "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process." In *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, edited by Harry Eckstein, 1st ed., 33–70. The University of Michigan: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Paulson-Smith, Kaden. 2022. "'Police Fire on Rioters': Everyday Counterinsurgency in a Colonial Capital." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 33 (4–5): 633–53.
- Reuter. 1950. "Attempted Murder." 42540/50. Dar es Salaam. CO 691/209/8. The National Archives, Kew.
- Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Brooklyn: Verso.
- SABC News. 2021. "Police Corruption Tops List of Complaints Received by Corruption Watch," September 23, 2021, sec. South Africa. <https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/police-corruption-tops-list-of-complaints-received-by-corruption-watch/>.
- Sakpa, Delali. 2020. "In Africa, Concerns over Rising Police Brutality." *Deutsche Welle*, September 7, 2020. <https://www.dw.com/en/in-africa-concerns-over-rising-police-brutality/a-54845922>.
- Schouten, Peer, and Jan Bachmann. 2022. "Infrastructural Frontiers: Terrains of Resistance at the Material Edge of the State." *Geoforum*, June.
- Schrader, Stuart. 2019. *Badges without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing*. Oakland, California: University of California Press.
- Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing like a State : How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . 2010. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Illustrated edition. New Haven London: Yale University Press.
- Seigel, Micol. 2018. *Violence Work: State Power and the Limits of Police*. Durham : London: Duke University Press Books.

- . 2019. “Always Already Military: Police, Public Safety, and State Violence.” *American Quarterly* 71 (2): 519–39.
- Shivji, Issa G., and Saida Yahya-Othman. 2014. *Escalating State Violence and Impunity: A Reader*. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Media Council of Tanzania.
- Sinclair, Georgina. 2007. *At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945–80*. Manchester, UK ; New York: Manchester University Press.
- . 2008. “The ‘Irish’ Policeman and the Empire: Influencing the Policing of the British Empire—Commonwealth.” *Irish Historical Studies* 36 (142): 173–87.
- Smith, Armitage. 1961. “Tanganyika Constitutional Conference Paper No. 3: The Establishment of Service Commissions with Functions Relating to the Appointment and Disciplinary Control of Police Officers.” Dar es Salaam. CO 1037/149. The National Archives, Kew.
- Steinberg, Jonny. 2014. “Policing, State Power, and the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy: A New Perspective.” *African Affairs* 113 (451): 173–91.
- Tanganyika Legislative Council. 1959. “No. 78 Use of Police Beyond Tanganyika Border.” Extracts from Legislative Council debates Volume 3, Sessions 58/59. Dar es Salaam. CO 822/1321. The National Archives, Kew.
- “Tanganyika: Strikes and Riots.” 1950. CO 691/209/8. The National Archives, Kew.
- The Stevedores and Dockworkers Union. 1950. “Letter from The Stevedores and Dockworkers Union to The Chief Secretariat to the Government.” Ref. No. DU/2/91. Dar es Salaam. CO 691/209/8. The National Archives, Kew.
- Transparency International. 2016. “How to Put an End to Police Corruption in Africa.” Transparency.Org. July 7, 2016. <https://www.transparency.org/en/news/corruption-of-police-in-africa-must-end-now>.
- Valencia Talane, Moepeng. 2021. “Our Police Can Do Better, Why Aren’t They?” *Transparency International* (blog). February 4, 2021. <https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/cpi-2020-police-brutality-south-africa>.
- Wall, Tyler. 2020. “The Police Invention of Humanity: Notes on the ‘Thin Blue Line.’” *Crime, Media, Culture* 16 (3): 319–36.
- Weaver, Vesla M., and Gwen Prowse. 2020. “Racial Authoritarianism in U.S. Democracy.” *Science* 369 (6508): 1176–78.
- Weber, Max. 1958. “Politics as a Vocation.” In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Young, Crawford. 1997. *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. American First edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.